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1. 
Argument 
The police unconstitutionally prolonged the stop to wait for the drug-
sniffing dog. 
The sole issue in this case is whether the police unconstitutionally 
prolonged the stop by delaying the administration of field sobriety tests to wait 
for a drug dog to sniff Mr. Edgar's car, even though the police had no reason to 
believe that the car contained drugs. 
This issue is heavily fact-dependent and turns on the dash-camera video 
entered into evidence and the police officers' trial testimony. The dash-camera 
video is particularly important; it requires careful observation because much of 
the significant information can only be heard (through the microphone on one of 
the officers) and not seen. 
To aid the Court in its decision, Mr. Edgar provides the following detailed 
timeline of the stop. All the times are drawn from the dash camera video, which 
Mr. Edgar referred to as Trial Exhibit 4 in his opening brief and which the State 
kindly attached to its responsive brief. The time line below lists the hour and 
minute, and where the actions or words are particularly important, the timeline 
lists the hour, minute, and second . 
Time Action 
7:35 Original officer pulls over Mr. Edgar's car 
and questions occupants 
7:38 Original officer returns to his police cruiser 
and calls for back-up and a K-9 unit 
1 
7:42 Original officer hears voice over his radio 
that says that K-9 unit would arrive at the 
scene in "15, maybe 10 minutes" 
7:42 Backup officer arrives on the scene and 
discusses stop with original officer 
7:44 Backup officer approaches Mr. Edgar's car 
and talks with Mr. Edgar (the driver) 
7:47 Backup officer leaves Mr. Edgar's car and 
talks to stranded motorists 
7:47 Officers discuss doing field sobriety tests and 
tell stranded drivers to step back 
7:48 Original officer moves car so that backup 
officer can film field sobriety tests on his dash 
camera; another officer arrives on the scene 
7:49 Dash camera view is blocked; original officer 
returns to Mr. Edgar's car 
7:50 Original officer stands outside Mr. Edgar's 
car; backup officer moves from Mr. Edgar's 
car to his police cruiser, and then he returns 
to Mr. Edgar's car 
7:51-52 Original officer walks around on sidewalk 
next to Mr. Edgar's car; backup officer is in 
front of his car and blocked from the dash 
' . camera s view 
7:53 K-9 officer arrives and talks with original 
officer 
7:53:59 Original officer tells the K-9 officers that he 
pulled over Mr. Edgar's car because the • driver was driving "erratically" 
7:54:20-38 Original officer tells the K-9 officer, "There's 
one other guy in the car. He's got gang 
involvement. I don't know if you want to 
leave them in or I can [inaudible]." The K-9 
officer replied, "I prefer having them out if 
you guys want to [inaudible]." The original 
officer responded, "It's up to you; whatever 
your preference is." 
7:55:11 Original officer informs the occupants to exit 
Mr. Edgar's car 
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7:55 The passenger is on the sidewalk 
7:57:35 Mr. Edgar is on the sidewalk with the backup 
officer. The officers testified that Mr. Edgar 
was wearing khaki pants. (R. 276:95, 169.) 
The dash camera video shows a man with 
khaki pants by the street sign. 
7:57:56 Mr. Edgar is doing the heel-toe-heel sobriety 
test 
7:58:11 Drug dog approaches Mr. Edgar's car 
7:58:45 Mr. Edgar stands on one leg to do another 
sobriety test; the drug dog barks at 7:58:48 
8:00 Drug dog leaves Mr. Edgar's car 
8:01:20-40 Original officer approaches Mr. Edgar and 
says that it is cold out and offers Mr. Edgar 
his coat; Mr. Edgar says that his coat is in the 
car, and the original officer volunteers to get 
it. 
8:02 Original officer and backup officer discuss 
sobriety tests 
8:02:35-40 Backup officer tells original officer: "He made 
it until about 12 seconds and then the dog 
came out." 
8:02:45- Backup officer tells original officer: "He 
8:03:04 followed my eyes exactly ... his eyes were 
jerkv at the end but it was quite dark." 
8:03:21-23 Original officer asks about the heel-toe-heel 
sobriety test and whether Mr. Edgar "broke 
heel contact." The backup officer responded, 
"Not during the [inaudible], but he wanted to 
back and start again." 
8:04-8:06 Original officer performs one more sobriety 
test on Mr. Edgar 
According to this timeline, the original officer commenced the stop at 7:35. 
He spent approximately nine minutes talking with the car's occupants, 
processing information in his police cruiser, calling for backup and for a K-9 unit, 
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and talking with the backup officer. The original officer knew at 7:42 that it was 
going to take 10 to 15 minutes for the K-9 unit to arrive. The backup officer 
arrived, questioned Mr. Edgar for two minutes, and had formed reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Edgar was driving impaired by 7:47; at that time, the officers 
had both formed reasonable suspicion and determined to do field sobriety tests. 
But the officers did not perform the field sobriety tests on Mr. Edgar until 
approximately 7:57, ten minutes later, when the drug dog arrived.1 
The State argues that the officers started administering the field sobriety 
tests at 7:50, but the record belies that contention. Because the original officer 
moved his car at 7:48, the dash camera does not have a clear view of Mr. Edgar's 
car. But what the dash camera does catch is the original officer's conversation 
with the K-9 officers at 7:54. In that conversation, the original officer tells the K-9 
officer about the car's occupants and asks if the K-9 officer wants to leave the 
occupants in the car during the dog sniff. (Trial Ex. 4 at 7:54:20-38.) The K-9 
officer responds, "I prefer having them out if you guys want to [inaudible]." (ld.) 
The video then shows Mr. Edgar on the sidewalk at 7:57; he is doing the 
heel-toe-heel sobriety test at 7:57:56 and the one-leg stand at 7:58:45. The drug 
dog sniffs the car from 7:58 to 8:00. The backup officer, who performed Mr. 
1 Mr. Edgar revises his argument in his opening brief that the officers 
delayed the administration of the field sobriety tests by twelve minutes. Closer 
examination of the video reveals that the officers delayed the tests by ten 
minutes. 
4 
• 
Edgar's sobriety tests, talked with the original officer about Mr. Edgar's tests 
around 8:02. 
The backup officer told the original officer, "He made it until about 12 
seconds and then the dog came out." (Trial Ex. 4 at 8:02:35-40.) This statement 
appears to refer to Mr. Edgar performing the one-leg stand test; the video shows 
him performing the one-leg stand at 7:58:45 and the drug dog barks at 7:58:48. 
The backup officer also tells the original officer, ""He followed my eyes 
exactly ... his eyes were jerky at the end but it was quite dark." (Id. at 8:02:45-
8:03:04.) The video shows that when the stop commenced, it was fairly light 
outside. (Id. at 7:35.) It is still fairly light around 7:50, but by 7:56, it is noticeably 
darker, and by 8:00 it is quite dark outside. (Id. at 7:50-8:00.) It is likely, then, that 
the backup officer performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test after 7:56, and 
likely around 8:00, when it was dark outside. 
The backup officer also reported to the original officer on Mr. Edgar's heel-
toe test. The video shows Mr. Edgar performing the heel-toe test at 7:57:56. 
The video, which shows Mr. Edgar performing the field sobriety tests after 
7:57:56, comports with the original officer's trial testimony. The original officer 
testified, "While [the backup officer] was performing field sobriety tests, [the K-9 
officer] ran the canine around the vehicle." (R. 267:128.) 
In sum, the officers knew at 7:42 that it would take 10 to 15 minutes for a 
drug dog to arrive. They formed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Edgar was 
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driving impaired at 7:47, but they did not perform the field sobriety tests until 
7:57, when they are shown on the video. This ten-minute delay unlawfully 
extended the stop. See State v. Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, ,r 11-12, 227 P.3d 271 
(reasoning that a 10- to 15-minute detention of passengers while waiting for a 
dog sniff was a substantial period); United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 663-64 
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that an officer asking six minutes of extraneous questions 
and waiting for an additional three and a half minutes for a canine sniff 
unreasonably prolonged the stop, especially when there was insufficient 
evidence that the police were diligently pursuing their investigation); United 
States v. Hight, No. 15-CR-00060-LTB, 2015 WL 4239003, at *5 (D. Colo. June 29, 
2015) (reasoning that an officer sitting in his car for 11 minutes, where most of his 
time was spent filling out forms and waiting for an officer to arrive to investigate 
an unrelated crime, unconstitutionally extended the duration of the stop); United 
States v. $167,070.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 3:13-CV-00324-LRH, 2015 WL 3658069, 
at *9 (D. Nev. June 12, 2015) (reasoning that officers conducting redundant 
records checks to prolong stop to allow for a canine sniff without additional 
reasonable suspicion made the prolongation of the stop unreasonable). 
Contrary to the State's assertions, there is no evidence that the officers 
were diligently pursuing their investigation during the 10-minute time period. 
The original officer had already processed the passenger's and Mr. Edgar's 
information while he was in his police cruiser from 7:38 to 7:42 (see R. 276:162-
6 
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65); the officers offered no testimony at trial about what they did during that ten-
minute period that progressed the investigation. 
What the dash camera does show during that period is an officer moving 
his car, another officer arriving on the scene, the original officer standing outside 
Mr. Edgar's car and walking around on the sidewalk, the backup officer going to 
his cruiser, and the original officer talking to the K-9 officers. The record gives no 
reason for the ten-minute delay; in fact, given the fact that the original officer is 
wandering around on the sidewalk for a few minutes, it appears that the officers 
were waiting to administer the field sobriety tests. The officers did not 
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expediently investigate [their] new suspicion" or II diligently pursue a means of 
investigation that [was] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." State 
v. Simons, 2013 UT 3, ,r 17, 296 P.3d 721 (quotations omitted). In fact, it does not 
appear that the officers' conduct during the ten minutes, "viewed objectively and 
in its totality," was "reasonably directed toward the proper ends of the stop." Id. 
,r 33 (quotations omitted). 
The cases relied on by the State do not change this result. In State v. Morris, 
2011 UT 40, 259 P.3d 116, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed when it was 
reasonable for an officer to prolong a stop once he smelled alcohol inside the 
stopped vehicle; the Court did not address the effect of a purposeful delay in 
investigation to wait for a drug dog. Similarly, State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, 
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157 P.3d 826, and State v. Ottenson, 920 P.2d 183 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), have no 
such discussion. 
A careful review of the video, taken in conjunction with the officers' trial 
testimony, shows that the officers delayed the administration of the field sobriety 
tests until after 7:57:56, even though they had formed reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Edgar was driving impaired at 7:47. The drug dog sniffed the car at 7:58, the 
same time that Mr. Edgar was performing the field sobriety tests. The record, 
then, fully supports Mr. Edgar's argument that the officers delayed the 
administration of the field sobriety tests ten minutes, until the drug dog sniffed 
the car. 
2. The police had no reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in the car, 
and therefore could not lawfully prolong the stop to wait for a drug dog. 
Officers may prolong a stop for the arrival of a drug-detection dog if the 
officers have reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car are transporting 
drugs. See State v. Juma, 2012 UT App 27, ,I8, 270 P.3d 564. "[R]easonable 
suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences, and cannot be merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
hunch." State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, il 32,321 P.3d 1039 (quotation omitted). 
The State's argument that suspicion of impairment also creates suspicion 
of the existence of drugs in the car diminishes the reasonable suspicion standard. 
8 
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A raspy voice, shaky hands, relaxed facial features, and constricted pupils do not 
constitute specific facts indicating that drugs are in the car; rather, all those 
factors point to is the possibility that the driver might have taken drugs. See State 
v. Jones, 280 P.3d 824, 831 (2012), aff d, 333 P.3d 886 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) ("The 
observation of slurred speech and 'cotton mouth' may-to an experienced 
officer-indicate that alcohol or drugs have been recently consumed. We have 
often found that slurred speech-coupled with other factors-may support 
reasonable suspicion that one is intoxicated or has been driving under the 
influence .... The State cites no caselaw, however, to suggest that either of these 
factors would tend to support a suspicion that the vehicle is transporting controlled 
substances. Our review of applicable caselaw has revealed only some indication 
that the factor of intoxication may be considered in determining probable cause 
the person may be possessing drugs on his or her person. We view this as distinct 
from a factor indicating transportation of drugs within the vehicle." (citations 
omitted)) 
To hold otherwise would allow police officers to search vehicles for drugs 
of any person who exhibits any signs of impaired driving. 
Moreover, the events in this case show that the officers had absolutely no 
specific facts from which to derive a reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the 
car. The officers here examined the front and back seats of the car with their 
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flashlights while talking to the car's occupants, and neither of them mentioned 
seeing any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or anything else that would suggest the 
presence of drugs in the vehicle. The police did not mention that Mr. Edgar or his 
passenger made any furtive gestures to hide drugs. The police did not smell 
anything. They did not indicate that a search of Mr. Edgar's and his passenger's 
names on the police database returned prior drug arrests or drug activity. 2 All 
the police knew was that Mr. Edgar was possibly impaired; they only had a 
hunch that drugs were in the car, nothing more. And a mere hunch cannot justify 
the extension of an investigatory stop. 
3. The search incident to arrest and inevitably discovery doctrines do not 
apply. 
The State argues that, alternatively, the dog sniff was justified as a search 
incident to arrest. 
The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine allows police to search a vehicle 
incident to "a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching 
2 Compare the facts in this case to those in State v. Kaleohano, 56 P.3d 138, 
148 (Haw. 2002), where the Hawaii Supreme Court noted that an officer had 
reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the car when he realized "he was 
dealing with somebody who had prior arrests for drug possession and who was 
driving a vehicle in which drugs had previously been discovered, [and] he 
suspected the erratic driving pattern may have been due to Kaleohano's drug 
impairment or her attempt to hide drugs after spotting the police vehicle on the 
road behind her." None of the facts justifying the reasonable suspicion in 
Kaleohano that drugs were in the car exist in this case. 
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distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
The application of this doctrine to his case, however, is tenuous because 
the record suggests that Mr. Edgar was arrested because the police searched the 
car. The backup officer testified that Mr. Edgar was arrested because of" drugs 
that were found in the car as well as DUI," therefore implying that the search 
that discovered the drugs came before the arrest. (R. 276:83.) The original officer 
also agreed that Mr. Edgar was arrested 11after you guys found the heroin in the 
car." (R. 276:151.) However, that officer also testified that that he placed Mr. 
Edgar under arrest after the dog "hit on the vehicle." (R. 276:166.) The video is 
not conclusive on this point. 
The weight of the evidence, however, suggests that the search of the 
vehicle occurred before Mr. Edgar was arrested. The search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine presupposes that the search follow or be concurrent with the arrest. See 
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. It therefore is inapplicable when the search occurs before 
and causes the arrest. 
Furthermore, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not help the State's 
argument. "A crucial element of inevitable discovery is independence; there 
must be some independent basis for discovery, and the investigation that 
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inevitably would have led to the evidence [must] be independent of the 
constitutional violation." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r 16, 76 P.3d 1159 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, there was "only one ongoing investigation" that led to Mr. Edgar's 
arrest and the dog sniff of the car. Id. ,r 19. The police unlawfully extended the 
stop by delaying the administration of sobriety tests to await the arrival of the 
drug-sniffing dog. The State's argument forgets that the police searched the car 
because the dog alerted to the car, not because of any suspicion that evidence 
was in the car that related to Mr. Edgar's possible impaired driving. (R. 276:129 
("[A]fter the canine officer came back he told me there was an indication on the 
vehicle; therefore, I started to search the vehicle.").) The unlawful extension of 
the stop and the discovery of the drugs were inextricably intertwined. 
Policy also weighs against the application of the inevitable discovery rule. 
"Allowing the evidence in this situation would provide no deterrent at all to 
future unlawful detentions." Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r 19. In fact, it would 
encourage officers to routinely delay the administration of field sobriety tests to 
run a drug dog around a car even when the officers have no reasonable suspicion 
that the car contains drugs. Such a ruling would allow the inevitable discovery 
rule to swallow the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
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Conclusion 
The police violated Mr. Edgar's Fourth Amendment rights when they 
delayed the administration of field sobriety tests for ten minutes while waiting 
for the drug dog to sniff the car. Utah's law regarding reasonable suspicion and 
dog sniffs of cars is robust (and is cited extensively in the opening brief) and 
provided sufficient authority for Mr. Edgar's attorney to bring a successful 
motion to suppress. 
Mr. Edgar's attorney did not, however, bring such a motion. His failure to 
bring the motion constitutes deficient performance, and Mr. Edgar was 
prejudiced thereby. If Mr. Edgar's attorney had moved to suppress the evidence 
in the car, the district court would have granted the motion, and none of the 
evidence in the car would have been admitted. That evidence alone formed basis 
for the charges against Mr. Edgar. Without that evidence, the State had no case 
against Mr. Edgar. 
For these reasons, Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction. 
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